This paper empirically examines the extent to which participants in the carbon market perceive EU ETS NAP and Verifications announcements to possess informational value. The study directs its attention to carbon returns and volatility movements around official EU ETS PHASE II announcements.. Following Mansanet-Bataller & Pardo (2007) we adapt an event study methodology which caters for the peculiarities of our data, using a Regression and Truncated Mean Model approach. Further, we source the earliest date a certain announcement is publicly released from both official and news sources, and examine both Phase I & II front futures and sole Phase II prices. We find that Phase II announcements have an influence on both Phase I & II front futures and sole Phase II futures carbon returns.
Truncated Mean Model approach. Further, we source the earliest date a certain announcement is publicly released from both official and news sources, and examine both Phase I & II front futures and sole Phase II prices. We find that Phase II announcements have an influence on both Phase I & II front futures and sole Phase II futures carbon returns.
In addition we find that the announcements have no significant impact on volatility.
Together, our findings suggest a systematic leakage of information across all types of announcements, consistent with .
INTRODUCTION
Within finance literature there has been a wide array of work focusing on the impact of scheduled releases of economic information such as earnings, dividends, inflation, money supply, and CPI announcements, on prices. However, the impact of non-scheduled announcements such as tender offers, investment proposals, new patents and discoveries, etc is limited in comparison. The study of unscheduled and sporadic information announcements is of interest to both academics and practitioners alike because they are more likely to produce abnormal returns and volatility that lie in the extreme tails of a distribution. The European Union Emissions Trading Schemes allows for the perfect opportunity to examine the effect of numerous unscheduled and sporadic releases of official information on a single price series. The market for European Union Allowances (EU ETS carbon credits) is also unique in several other ways. Firstly, the asset itself is a product of legislation 1 , where individual governments under the supervision of the European Commission are responsible for setting emissions caps and allocating EUAs to firms. Therefore the National Allocation
Plans that we examine essentially set the supply of EUAs, and the Verifications report the demand during the preceding period and the remaining supply. Further, because the supply and demand in carbon markets operates within constraints set by the ruling government, it creates a level of political risk not present in other markets. Secondly, there is likely to be a higher degree of information asymmetry in the carbon markets. A select group of government employees and firm level auditors are apt to information regarding caps and model that measures the abnormal returns from a benchmark period (see Mann and Dowen (1997) and Tse and Hackard (2006) , among others). In this study, we have followed these two approaches when applying statistical event study methodology using daily carbon futures returns. However, in line with , the unscheduled, sporadic and numerous nature of the announcements with the existence of a huge amount of very closed and unscheduled announcements affecting a sole price series requires the need to minimize big surprises during the prediction period when applying the Constant Mean Return model. Therefore the Truncated Mean model is used which is a modification of the Constant Mean Return model in which the abnormal returns in the estimation period are obtained using a truncated mean.
What differentiates our study to that of , is that we focus mainly on EU ETS Phase II announcements (National Allocation Plans) and Phase I verifications on both the front futures (which include both Phase I & II prices) and the sole Phase II futures prices (Dec 2008 expiry). The study of Phase II prices and announcements is of greater importance because under the EU ETS, it is the first Kyoto Protocol complaint phase of emissions trading. The EU Phase I emissions trading scheme was actually initiated as a trial phase in order to prepare for Phase II within which real abatement was to occur.
Subsequently, Phase I EUAs were found to be over allocated. Phase II allocations are more restrictive and are likely to lead to a real reduction and abatement in emissions. In fact, as Furthermore, since about mid 2006, the majority of EU ETS trading has occurred in the Phase II December 2008 expiry carbon contract 5 . Therefore the study of Phase II announcements and its impact on both the front futures and phase II futures returns is likely to yield more robust conclusions regarding the impact of carbon announcements on carbon returns and volatility. This will provide further insights into the operation of the EU ETS into the future, and may highlight regulatory factors which can be improved upon.
An additional variation we make to the study is that we source the earliest date on which an official announcement becomes public by searching through both official and carbon specific news databases. This is an attempt to address a limitation in the Mansanet-Bataller and Pardo study which did not account for information leaks that became public before the official announcement date. Information leakage occurred notably in Phase I when several member states released their 2005 emissions data ahead of the European Commission's official release date 6 .
INFORMATION ASYMMETRY AND UNCERTAINTY
Information asymmetry and uncertainty is a dominant feature of the cap and trade EU ETS.
The two major sources of information asymmetry and uncertainty are derived from the process of setting future emissions caps based on projected figures and past emissions (the supply constraint) and the yearly verification of emission through audits. The AR-GARCH model in their case presents the market expectations and is used to provide forecast returns in the period around the event. Their methodology analyzes both the daily differences in the realized and expected returns as well as the cumulated differences for the period around the event. Consistent with , trends in the cumulated abnormal returns in their study preceding the event suggest that the information about the event is known by some part of the market in advance. They also find that verifications announcements proved to have more effect on market dynamics than NAP announcements.
Similarly, Chevailler, Ieplo, and Mercier (2008) This suggests that uncertainty surrounding Phase I verifications affect the carbon market.
RELEASE OF INFORMATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION EMISSION TRADING SCHEME
The NAP is the document in which Member States determine both the total quantity of CO2 allowances available in the Member State and the allocation made to each installation covered by the Scheme, which must subsequently be approved by the European Commission.
The Draft of this document must be published for public consultation before the Member State final version is delivered to the European Commission. Once the NAP has been notified, the European Commission has 3 months for its assessment, and the publication of the corresponding Commission Decision. It is compulsory that the European Commission approves the NAP of each country. If it is not the case, the NAP will be modified until the European Commission approves it. All NAPs must be submitted to the European Commission by the end of the June two years before the start of the corresponding Phase, so that the final NAP can be approved at the end of that year. The procedure makes it difficult to know in advance the exact date of publication of new information. 8 Figure I depicts this process graphically.
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[Please, insert Figure I ]. 
INFLUENCE OF THE ANNOUNCEMENTS ON CARBON RETURNS
If security prices reflect all currently available information, then price changes must reflect new information. Therefore it is possible to measure the importance of an event of interest by examining price changes during the period in which the event occurs.
The event study methodology is a technique of empirical financial research that enables an observer to assess the impact of a particular event on a price series. The statistical approach for the measurement of a particular information release has the objective to compute the difference between the actual return of the respective security and the return that would be expected by the market, which is known as abnormal return.
We have applied the event study methodology to the return series constructed as mentioned in the previous section, in order to examine carbon returns behaviour around NAP and (2007), we have chosen the most representative prices of oil, and natural gas in Europe. In order to take into account the series of energy variables that better fits the front futures contract of carbon explained before, we have also constructed the front contract for the energy variables. That is, we have chosen the contract for the energy variables with the closest maturity to the maturity of the carbon contract considered. All series data have been taken from the Reuters Database.
The futures contract on WTI Crude Oil is quoted in US$ per barrel, the futures contract on Natural Gas is quoted in GBP per therm. To carry out the study, we have converted them into Euros using the daily exchange rate data available from the European Central Bank. 10 As in the case of carbon prices, energy prices also present a unit root and they have been converted into stationary returns taking first logarithm differences in the same way as carbon prices:
where P it is the i-th price at time t and where i = c (WTI Crude), and g (Natural Gas).
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The dummy variables have been taken into account in two ways. In the first model, we have considered the effect of one dummy variable for each type of event described before ( Table III. [Please, insert [Please, insert Examining the estimated regressions for the Phase I & II front futures in Table II Table II Additionally, when examining regulatory events on the carbon market, the formal date or the day the information becomes public may not coincide with the date when the new information reaches the market. This is due to the high level of information asymmetry present in the infant stage EU ETS, as discussed earlier. In this case, the use of the regression approach may have little power to reject the null hypothesis of no effect on the carbon price.
For all these reasons, we extend our analysis to include the Truncated Mean model analysis that allows a broader range of days be analyzed.
The Truncated Mean Model
Following Mansanet-Bataller & Pardo (2007), we have adopted the truncated mean model approach which is a truncated version of the Constant Mean Return Model (Brown and Warner, 1985) . The abnormal returns are measured as the difference of the returns in t minus a mean return from some benchmark of the estimation period. However, the benchmark return is a truncated average of the estimation period. That is, in order to calculate the truncated mean return, we have excluded the 10% higher returns and the 10% lower returns of the estimation period. Because we are examining a sole commodity (carbon prices) which is affected by a huge quantity of closed and sporadic announcements, the objective is to try to minimize the effect of big surprises in the estimation period.
We have defined a,τ as the truncated mean for the announcement day "a" and the 2*l days around it (l is the number of days in the prediction period before the announcement, which coincides with the number of days after it). In order to calculate this truncated mean we proceed as follows:
1. We consider the announcement day as the reference day ( t = 0 ).
2. We define the estimation period as the days included in the interval from t 1 =-(τ+l) 1 to t 2 = -( l+1). We have considered τ = 10, 20 and 30. Therefore, following Milonas (1987) the estimation periods have effectively τ days and finish l+1 days before the announcement.
3. We reorder the τ returns of the estimation period from the smallest to the largest one such that r 1 is the smallest return in the estimation period and r τ the largest one with τ = 10, 20 and 30 respectively.
4. We define k as the number representing 10% of the estimation period and consequently it is the number of returns that will be excluded from each of the extremes: k = τ * p where τ is the number of days in the estimation period and p = 10%.
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Given that k is an integer, following Wilcox (2001) we have obtained the truncated mean as:
Note that r i is the i th return of the estimation period after they have been ascending ordered.
Additionally, we have calculated for any announcement "a", a standardized excess return ZR a,t for each day of the prediction period. 14 The standardized excess returns are the excess returns standardized by the truncated standard deviation in the estimation period, calculated
13 Note that k is 1, 2, and 3 in the case of an estimation period of 10, 20, and 30 days, respectively. 14 The prediction period has (2*l + 1) days.
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following the same procedure as in the mean case. The expression for the standardized excess returns is:
We then calculate, for each of the (2*l+1) days of the prediction period, the portfolio standardized excess returns, which is an equally weighted portfolio of the standardized excess returns:
where N is the number of announcements of a specific type of event. The null hypothesis is to test whether the portfolio excess returns are equal to zero on the day of the announcement ( t = 0 ). These results are presented in Panel C of Table IV Note: In this Table we present the results of the test which null hypothesis is that the portfolio excess return are equal to zero. In our case we perform this test for the day of the announcement, the 3 previous days and the 3 next days. In Panel A we present the results with the complete sample. In Panel B we consider the announcements days where there has not been an announcement within the 3 previous days. Finally in Panel C we consider the announcements days where there has not been an announcement within the 6 days round the announcement. The first column in the Table presents the days ("0" is the announcement day). The next four columns refer to the standardized returns and the last 4 columns to the standardized residuals of the model 1 in the previous Table regression . The ZRt mean column shows the mean of the portfolio of the standardized returns (residuals) for each of the event groups (NAPs and Verification), and the p-value column shows the p-value of the test. Number refers to the number of times an announcement of each kind event has been produced. * denotes statistical significance at the 1% level.
Days
ZRt Note: In this Table we present the results of the test which null hypothesis is that the portfolio excess return are equal to zero. In our case we perform this test for the day of the announcement, the 3 previous days and the 3 next days. In Panel A we present the results with the complete sample. In Panel B we consider the announcements days where there has not been an announcement within the 3 previous days.
Finally in Panel C we consider the announcements days where there has not been an announcement within the 6 days round the announcement. The first column in the Table presents the days ("0" is the announcement day). The next four columns refer to the standardized returns and the last 4 columns to the standardized residuals of the model 1 in the previous Table regression . The ZRt mean column shows the mean of the portfolio of the standardized returns (residuals) for each of the event groups (NAPs and Verification), and the p-value column shows the p-value of the test. Number refers to the number of times an announcement of each kind event has been produced. * denotes statistical significance at the 1% level. Table IV and V documents that there are many events in which there are statistically significant differences before the announcement date. This occurs when we consider the complete sample (Panel A) and when we take into account the other two scenarios (Panel B and C) . Additionally most of the announcement days present statistical significance which means that the new information has an effect on the price series when it becomes public. As to what concerns the statistical significance after the announcement day, we should only focus on Panel C of Table IV as it is the only one clean of other announcements dates in the prediction period.
In order to study in depth which type of announcement is relevant to the market we have performed the analysis with the events considered separately. The results for the most restrictive scenario, the one considering only the announcements without any other announcement in the six days surrounding it, are presented in Table VI and VII.
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EARLIEST PHASE I [Please, insert Table VI] .
Note: In this Table we present the results of the test in which the null hypothesis is that the portfolio excess return is equal to zero, for the scenario most restrictive (considering the announcement day without any other announcement on the six days surrounding it). In our case we perform this test for the day of the announcement, the 3 previous days and the next 3 days. Panel A (B) present the results for the returns (residuals of the regression of Model 1 in Table II & III) taking into account exclusively the announcements without any other announcement 3 days before and after it. In all cases the ZR mean column shows the mean of the portfolio of the standardized returns for each of the events considered, and the p-value column shows the p-value of the test. Number refers to the number of times an announcement of each type has been produced. * denotes statistical significance at the 1% level. Note: In this Table we present the results of the test in which the null hypothesis is that the portfolio excess return is equal to zero, for the scenario most restrictive (considering the announcement day without any other announcement on the six days surrounding it). In our case we perform this test for the day of the announcement, the 3 previous days and the next 3 days. Panel A (B) present the results for the returns (residuals of the regression of Model 1 in Table II & III) taking into account exclusively the announcements without any other announcement 3 days before and after it. In all cases the ZR mean column shows the mean of the portfolio of the standardized returns for each of the events considered, and the p-value column shows the p-value of the test. Number refers to the number of times an announcement of each type has been produced. * denotes statistical significance at the 1% level. Approval all exhibit a significant negative reaction. For Phase II futures, it may reflect that the market tends to price in a restrictive cap when member states initially notify the EC of their NAP. Therefore on subsequent amendments and conditional approvals the market reduces its perceived expectation of a very restrictive cap and hence the negative reactions.
Days

In addition, although the Phase II NAPs are more restrictive and will result in an average cut of nearly 7% below the 2005 emission levels, the inclusion of offsets undermines this claim.
This may be another reason for the negative reactions to the majority of Phase II NAP announcements. Concerning, Phase I& II futures, the market may be reacting negatively because the more restrictive nature of the Phase II NAPs signal to the market that the allocations of EUAs for Phase I of the EU ETS could have been too generous.
Reviewing the reactions on the days surrounding Verifications announcements (2005, and 2007 ) 17 , we can observe that they fail to cause a significant reaction on the day of the announcement. However, there are significant price movements leading up to the announcement day. This confounding discovery may suggest that there is considerable leakage of verifications data before the information becomes public, and that the information has already been impounded into the price. These findings lend further credence to the allegations of a high degree of information asymmetry and possible insider trading concerning EU ETS official announcements.
The leakage of information is quite evident in the results even when considering the most restrictive scenario in which there are no other announcements in the 6 days surrounding the announcement of interest. In many cases the significant price reaction leading up to an announcement is also in the same direction. This confirms the existence of information leakage.
Panel B of Table VI This may suggest that there is uncertainty following information releases in the EUA market and that it requires several days to accurately price in the information.
INFLUENCE OF THE ANNOUNCEMENTS ON CARBON VOLATILITY
We also review the impact of Phase II NAPs and Phase I Verifications announcements on carbon returns volatility. This allows us to examine whether there is a systematic leakage of information. Because the announcements are mainly unscheduled and sporadic, one would expect that upon becoming public there would be a higher degree of volatility as the news is priced in. However, if there is no change in volatility, it may suggest a systematic leakage of the information before it becomes public.
In order to test the difference in volatility before and after the event we have performed two different tests. Firstly, by applying the Brown-Forsythe test we have tested the equality of variances of carbon returns before and after the announcement. Secondly, we have performed a sign test in which we compare the variance of the carbon standardized returns before and after the announcement. Consistent with the previous section, we have also performed those two tests using the residual series of the regression of the carbon returns taking as independent variables the energy returns.
Brown and Forsythe test
The Brown-Forsythe test allows testing for seasonality in the unconditional variance. The
Brown-Forsythe test statistic is computed as We present the results of the Brown-Forsythe test applied to the announcement days without any other announcement on the 6 days around it in Panels A and B of . In all cases, the null hypothesis is that the variance during the 5 days preceding the announcement day is equal to the variance in the period made up of the announcement day and the next 4 days. In Panel A and B, the times the null hypothesis is rejected expressed in percentage. The different rows present the results for the possible alternative hypothesis. The last row shows the total of announcements of each type of event. In order to be consistent with the previous analysis, the announcement days considered are those without any announcement on the 6 days around it. For both Panel C and D, the series are standardized with the truncated mean and variance of a period of 10 days. Overwhelmingly our results illustrate that the majority of announcements cause no statistical difference in variance following the announcement. In the isolated case where the variance before and after the announcement is statistically different, an increase of the variance is detected after the announcement. These results are coherent with the idea that NAPs-related announcements do not have an important effect on carbon volatility.
Sign Test of Carbon Variance
Following and Milonas (1987) , we have performed the equality test of the variance of the standardized excess returns in order to completely assess the equality of the variance before and after the announcement. Consistent with the previous analysis, we have also applied this test to the residuals series. Specifically, we have separated the period which comprises of the 5 previous days to the announcement from the period comprised of the day of the announcement and the next 4 consecutive days. We then proceed to test the equality of the variances of the standardized returns explained in the Truncated
Mean Model section with l = 5 between the two sub-periods. As in the case of the BrownForsythe test and for the same reasons, we have considered the sample period of the announcements without any other announcements on the 6 days surrounding it.
The null hypothesis of the sign test is that the variance of the standardized returns (residuals) during the five days preceding the announcement of a particular event is equal to the variance of the standardized returns (residuals) in the period starting from the announcement day and finishing 4 days after. We represent this as follows:
That is, if the sample data for each type of event is consistent with the hypothesized variance value for this particular event, half of the sample observations related to the event will lie above and half below. Thus the number of observations larger than K can be used to test the validity of the null hypothesis. The two possible alternative hypotheses are:
: and
As the distribution of the random variable K is the binomial probability with parameters N and θ, with θ = 0.5, the rejection region for the for an α-level test is:
where ' is chosen to be the largest integer which satisfies:
where N is the number of announcements of a particular event.
For , the rejection region for an α-level test is:
Where is chosen to be the smalled integer which satisfies:
The results of the one-side tests for the events considered grouped are shown in Panel C of 18 In both cases the p-value is presented for the two possible alternative hypotheses.
As shown in Panels C and D of Table VI , for all of the events, the carbon returns present the same variances before and after the event unanimously (all p-values are larger than α = 0.05).
In the case of the residuals series it is not possible to reject the null hypothesis and consequently we cannot reject the equality of variances of residual series before and after the announcement. The results of the tests are the same for all types of events independent of whether we consider the variables grouped together or separately. These results are in line with the results obtained with the previous test and indicate a statistically insignificant effect of Phase II EU ETS NAP announcements on carbon volatility.
18 In this case the returns and residuals are standardized with the truncated mean and variance of a period of 10 days.
CONCLUSION
This study is based on the notion that commodity markets are information driven mechanisms which determine equilibrium prices. If markets are active, the information is quickly disseminated among market participants who, upon trading, determine a fair price. Prices can also reflect information which is not publicly announced by a governmental agency but yet successfully forecasted by private agents or leaked by insiders. Therefore this investigation has the ability to shed light on the effectiveness of regulatory agencies in providing the market with useful and reliable forecasts. 
